Appendices - Hirohito's War

A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
J. Pacific War Photographs
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 

O. Japanese – Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria

Invasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern Siberia: Unlike the advance in the west, the action in the east was immediate. soldiers of the Soviet 5th Army crossed the border in darkness at 1 a.m on 9 August. at first it was unclear to the Japanese whether they were being attacked. Many believed that the artillery fire was merely night maneuvers to which the Japanese had become inured in previous months. at 3.00 a.m. General Shiina told his officers at the Yeho Officers club that “an element of their [soviet] infantry seems to have broken through the borders”23 and ordered that the border garrison resist until the main force could “destroy the enemy’s fighting power by putting up stubborn resistance in depth in our main defensive positions.”24

Still it was not clear whether it was only a minor incursion as some Japanese commanders believed. There was no clarification as to whether the Soviets were formally at war with Japan until a Tass agency report was received at 4 a.m. on 9 August, three hours after hostilities had been initiated. Tass relayed the information that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan at 5 p.m. on the previous day, 8 August. It provoked a ‘Pearl Harbor Moment’ among the Japanese leadership, who realized that it had been duped by the Soviets who had led them to believe that they were helping Japan’s peace negotiations in good faith. as the Japanese had done at Pearl Harbor, the Soviets launched a surprise attack before an official declaration of war. Foreign Ministry official, Kase Toshikazu, complained that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was “the most unkind cut of all . . . we had asked for an olive branch and received a dagger thrust instead.”25 Still the communiqué sent in Hirohito’s name was dismissive of the threat: “However the scale of these attacks is not large.”26

By evening of 9 August elements of the 5th Army had penetrated some 12–28 miles into Manchuria along a 30-mile front. Already Soviet armor was threatening to cut rail, road and telegraph connections to Mutanchiang. a three-day target had been achieved in one. Fleeing Japanese troops arrived at the Muleng River only to find that their colleagues had already blown the bridge and, unable to ford the channels, they were forced to abandon their trucks and heavy equipment and skedaddle downstream of the advancing Soviet forces.

The Soviet progress was so rapid that the Japanese advance garrisons were unable to offer any delay and prevented the 135th, 126th and 124th Divisions from establishing a solid second defensive line. By nightfall of 10 August the Soviets had advanced 55 miles and the following day they achieved their eight-day targets in three. Behind them Japanese fortified regions at Pamientung and Linkou were enveloped. By day eight they had succumbed along with the northeastern coastal town of Chongjin situated inside the north Korean border. The fortified garrison of Hutou, north of the confluence of the Muleng River and Ussuri River (tributaries that fed into the Amur River) was also invested. again the garrison was cut off, leaving just a few soldiers able to make their escape westward toward Mishan and Poli. The remainder settled in for a prolonged siege. as on the Western front, Marshal Kirill Meretskov’s forces penetrated through terrain that had been deemed impassable. This time it was the 1st red Banner Army, which penetrated the mountainous border region.

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