Appendices - Hirohito's War

A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
J. Pacific War Photographs
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 

E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze

Halsey: After Leyte Gulf: The overwhelming victory at the Battle of Leyte Gulf on 26 October should have provided a period of respite for Halsey’s battle weary ships and sailors. Furthermore it should have given Halsey, chastened by his mistakes at Leyte Gulf, time to plan for the first strikes to be made against Japan’s home islands since his daring ‘Doolittle Raid’ two and a half years earlier. However, these plans were interrupted. Torrential rains and topographic problems on Leyte Island put back the Seabees’ construction of airfields, which prevented General Kenney from advancing his Air Force to their planned bases. As a result the Third Fleet remained stationed off the Philippines to provide air cover.

Between 5 and 25 November 1944, Halsey mounted seven mass attacks on Luzon’s airfields. 800 Japanese aircraft were destroyed. In addition five enemy transports were sunk with the loss of 10,000 Japanese troops along with their three escorting destroyers. Even by sea, by 1944, the US could deliver devastating air power against Japan’s land based forces. The old shibboleth that aircraft carriers should always stay out of range of land-based airfields had been reversed. It was a superiority that reflected massively improved American equipment against a Japanese Air Force that was never able to produce a mass produced fighter plane to succeed the Zero; in just three years, the Mitsubishi Zero had become technologically outdated. As an American ace pilot wrote, “The Corsair was a sweet-flying baby if I ever flew one. No longer would we have to fight the Nip’s fight, for we could make our own rules.”1 [The Vought F4U Corsair, mainly built under contract by the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, was designed principally as a carrier aircraft though, because of its poor landing characteristics, it ended up mainly being used by the Marine Corps land based forces. It was introduced at the beginning of 1943. Heavily armed with six machine guns and four cannon, the Corsair was also faster (+37 mph) and had a 5.5 per cent faster climb rate than the American carrier fleet’s Grumman F6F Hellcat, itself a replacement for the Grumman F4F Wildcat, that was already significantly outperforming the Japanese Zero.]

Such was the success of Admiral Halsey’s mission and the increasing paucity of the Japanese opposition that the last major air strike against Luzon took place on 18 November. Halsey cancelled further major operations and set up a system of patrols. “Bull Halsey’s Third Fleet has been doing quite a job on the Japs on Luzon,” gloated Seaman James Fahey.2 But, in spite of Halsey’s air superiority over the Philippines, a new threat emerged to quickly dampen any lasting joy from the victory at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

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