Appendices - Hirohito's War


A.	Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose December 1941 – August 1945 [Charts: A.1]
	Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama Canal, The Failure of Japanese Submarine Design, Wasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine Force, Japanese Submarine Cargo Missions to Europe, Japanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ Performance, Japan’s ‘Long Lance’ Jockeys, Newport Torpedo Station, Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood, US Submarine Achievements in the Pacific War, The Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine Strategy, The Missed Opportunity [Photos]

B.	Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging' December 1941 to August 1945 [Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
	Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific War, America’s T-2 Tanker, Japan’s Oil Tanker Fleet, Raw Materials Issues of the US Economy, Liberty Ships ‘to go’, Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins Boats, Japan’s Cargo Ship Problems, Japan’s Air Force Logistics, US Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific Region, Operation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement [Photos]

C.	Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized [Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
	Management of the US Wartime Economy, Guns and Butter, Inflation and ‘General Max’, Production Line and Management Systems, Productivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and Women, Managing the Scientists, Expansion of America’s Productive Capacity, US Aircraft Production, Tanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of Obsolescence, Electronics, Radio, and Radar, Was the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?, Japan’s Wartime Economy, Conclusion [Photos]

D.	‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny [Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
	The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial Expansion, The Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere, Old Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, The Structures of Japan’s New Empire, Slave Labor in Japan and in the Field, Cruelty and Suppression, Prisoners of War, The Psychology of Brutality, Unit 731 and the Secrets of Medical Experimentation, Conclusion, [Photos]

E.	Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze [October 1944 to August 1945] [Charts: E.1 ]
	Introduction, Halsey: After Leyte Gulf, Kamikaze: Individual Beginnings, The Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a Strategy, Recruitment, Motivation and Training, Japanese Government Propaganda, Developments in Kamikaze Technology and the US Response, Naval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide Mission, US Defense Tactics, Fight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive), Admiral Ugaki, The Last Kamikaze, The Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze Campaign, Kamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? [Photos]

F.	American Intelligence in the Pacific War
	ULTRA [Photos]

G.	Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
	Introduction , Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power , Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight , Weapons that could have won Japan the War , Strategies for Japanese Victory , Conclusion

H.	Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War [December 1941 - August 1945]

I.	The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists

J.	Pacific War Photographs

K.	The Battle of Hong Kong
	Hong Kong [Photos]

L.	The Battles of Attu and Kiska
	Attu and Kiska [Photos]

M.	Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
	Summary, Comparison of Pacific War Aircraft Carriers, Essex Class Carriers, US Light Carriers, Japanese fleet carriers [Photos]

N.	The Role of Oil in the Pacific War [Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
	Oil’s Early History, Development of the Oil Industry in the United States, Royal Dutch Shell, The Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine Industry, The Rise of the Automobile, Tanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield Mobility, Aviation Gasoline, Interwar Development of the Aeronautical Industry, Global Oil Output, Oil and the Decision for War, Conclusion [Photos]

O.	Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria [April 1945–5 September 1945] [Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
	Introduction, Russo-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth Century, The Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast Asia, The Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River Clashes, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, The Yalta Conference, Japanese Preparations for the Defense of Manchuria, Deployment of Soviet Forces, Soviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from Mongolia, Invasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern Siberia, The Battle of Mutanchiang, The Battle of Sakhalin Island, The Occupation of the Kuril Islands The Significance of the Soviet Invasions

APPENDIX C
ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED

Managing the Scientists: It was not just manual skills but also intellectual ability that was put to better use during the war. America’s aeronautical advances were also aided by the efforts of Dr. Vannevar Bush, the son of a Massachusetts preacher who took a PhD in Electrical Engineering at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Engineering). The energetic, politically astute academic became President of the Carnegie Institution in Washington in 1939 and in August was appointed to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. This cash starved group had developed a creditable performance in the supervision of standards for commercial aviation manufacture but lacked the resources to provide much assistance to the rapidly developing military aircraft sector.

Bush wanted government financing to fund scientists to develop high risk but promising research projects that the military had overlooked. Bush, who had become disturbed at the lack of American efforts to re-arm in the face of the Nazi threat, had initiated efforts to coordinate and mobilize the science community to develop technologies and products to combat the emerging external threats. He hooked up with FDR’s close confidante, Harry Hopkins, with whom he struck up a close relationship and got himself in front of the President. The resulting National Defence Research Committee (NDRC) co-opted top scientists from US industry including Frank Jewett who was president of Bell Telephone Industries as well as the National Academy of Sciences, James Constant, a former chemist and president of Harvard, and Karl Compton, president of MIT.

In 1941 Professor Bush was put in charge of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) into which the National Defense Research Council was merged. This body took charge of the management and dissemination of British technology, notably radar and nuclear research. The OSRD also organized the development of nuclear fission technology until it was taken over by the Army Corps of Engineers, code named the ‘Manhattan Project’, in 1942. The ‘Manhattan Project’ spent more than half of the US$3.8bn spent on military research and development during the war. Universities that participated in the research program included MIT, the California Institute of Technology, Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, Johns Hopkins and the University of Chicago. Enterprise research institutes and departments were also recipients of the government’s largesse including at Western Electric, General Electric, Westinghouse, RCA, Remington, Rand and Eastman Kodak. The scale of US government funding was such that it filtered down into to all areas of the military industrial complex and ended up producing weapons and equipment that were generations ahead of Japan’s by the time that World War II ended.

Another NDRC member, James Conant, president of Harvard, recalled that “I shall never forget my surprise at hearing about this revolutionary scheme. Scientists were to be mobilized for the defense effort in their own laboratories.”⁴⁰ The result was that Bush managed to finance and co-ordinate US scientists and pushed them forward to unleash a tidal wave of military technological innovation. Bush’s only regret was that it came ten years too late: “If we had been on our toes in war technology ten years ago we would probably not have had this damn war.”⁴¹

Appendices - Hirohito's War

APPENDIX C ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED

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APPENDIX C
ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED