Appendices - Hirohito's War

A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
J. Pacific War Photographs
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 


Oil and the Decision for War: In the context of Japan’s desperate pre-war search for oil it is perhaps not surprising that Japan viewed America’s de facto oil embargo in July 1941 as an existential threat to Japan’s economic fortunes and its ability to sustain an Asian Empire. As historian Louis Morton noted in Command Decisions [1983] “The shortage of oil was the key to Japan’s military situation. It was the main problem for those preparing for war, at the same time, the reason why the nation was moving toward war… Without oil, Japan’s pretensions to empire were empty shadows.”13 Roosevelt was fully aware of the implications of an oil embargo. Joseph Grew, Ambassador to Japan, met Roosevelt twice in the autumn of 1939 and wrote afterwards in his diary, “I also said that if we cut off Japanese supplies of oil and if Japan then finds that she cannot obtain sufficient oil from other commercial sources to ensure her national security, she will in all probability send her fleets down to take the Dutch East Indies.”14

Ultimately the oil embargo was the trigger for Japan’s attack on America; believing that it could obtain all the oil it required from the Dutch East Indies, the Imperial General Staff received Hirohito’s approval for an attack on South Asia and the United States, whose Empire in the Philippines stood in its way – thus enabling, so Japan leaders thought, to sustain its war machine and its empire. It was a fatally flawed assumption. Even before the war Admiral Yamamoto was limiting naval exercises to home waters to conserve oil stocks. In a symbolic gesture Japanese authorities in Tokyo cut oil supplies to the American and British Embassies.

In spite of the importance of oil in Japanese thinking, curiously Yamamoto neglected to target US oil storage facilities at Pearl Harbor. It was a target that was far more important than battleships. “We had about 4.5 million barrels of oil out there,” observed Admiral Nimitz, “and all of it was vulnerable to 0.50 caliber bullets. None of the oil tanks had bomb-proof covers. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil it would have prolonged the war another two years.”15 As Admiral Husband E. Kimmel told the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, “The thing that tied the fleet to the base [Pearl Harbor] more than any one factor was the question of fuel.”16 The failure to target the oil facilities at Pear Harbor was not a mistake of intelligence. As historian Gordon Prange has noted, ‘The Japanese knew all about those oil storage tanks. Their failure to bomb the Fleet’s oil supply reflected their preoccupation with tactical rather than logistical targets…”17 In hindsight the failure to attack US oil facilities at Pearl Harbor can be seen as one of the most significant tactical mistakes of the Pacific War.

As Chart N.5 illustrates, Japanese oil inventories fell from a peak of nearly 50,000 barrels in 1941 to less than 5,000 barrels by 1945. A combination of a lack of technological sophistication to sustain let alone develop the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies combined with an inadequate supply of oil tankers [See Chart C.13], meant that Japan was never able to make up for the oil that it could no longer purchase from the world’s dominant supplier, the United States. It is notable that during the war America became supplier of oil to the world; Standard Oil of New Jersey alone supplied 25 percent of all oil used by the Allies in World War II. By comparison at the end of the war the Japanese Navy was having fill oil bunkers of its battleships with edible soya oil.

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