Appendices - Hirohito's War


A.	Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose December 1941 – August 1945 [Charts: A.1]
	Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama Canal, The Failure of Japanese Submarine Design, Wasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine Force, Japanese Submarine Cargo Missions to Europe, Japanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ Performance, Japan’s ‘Long Lance’ Jockeys, Newport Torpedo Station, Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood, US Submarine Achievements in the Pacific War, The Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine Strategy, The Missed Opportunity [Photos]

B.	Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging' December 1941 to August 1945 [Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
	Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific War, America’s T-2 Tanker, Japan’s Oil Tanker Fleet, Raw Materials Issues of the US Economy, Liberty Ships ‘to go’, Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins Boats, Japan’s Cargo Ship Problems, Japan’s Air Force Logistics, US Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific Region, Operation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement [Photos]

C.	Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized [Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
	Management of the US Wartime Economy, Guns and Butter, Inflation and ‘General Max’, Production Line and Management Systems, Productivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and Women, Managing the Scientists, Expansion of America’s Productive Capacity, US Aircraft Production, Tanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of Obsolescence, Electronics, Radio, and Radar, Was the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?, Japan’s Wartime Economy, Conclusion [Photos]

D.	‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny [Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
	The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial Expansion, The Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere, Old Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, The Structures of Japan’s New Empire, Slave Labor in Japan and in the Field, Cruelty and Suppression, Prisoners of War, The Psychology of Brutality, Unit 731 and the Secrets of Medical Experimentation, Conclusion, [Photos]

E.	Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze [October 1944 to August 1945] [Charts: E.1 ]
	Introduction, Halsey: After Leyte Gulf, Kamikaze: Individual Beginnings, The Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a Strategy, Recruitment, Motivation and Training, Japanese Government Propaganda, Developments in Kamikaze Technology and the US Response, Naval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide Mission, US Defense Tactics, Fight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive), Admiral Ugaki, The Last Kamikaze, The Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze Campaign, Kamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? [Photos]

F.	American Intelligence in the Pacific War
	ULTRA [Photos]

G.	Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
	Introduction , Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power , Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight , Weapons that could have won Japan the War , Strategies for Japanese Victory , Conclusion

H.	Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War [December 1941 - August 1945]

I.	The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists

J.	Pacific War Photographs

K.	The Battle of Hong Kong
	Hong Kong [Photos]

L.	The Battles of Attu and Kiska
	Attu and Kiska [Photos]

M.	Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
	Summary, Comparison of Pacific War Aircraft Carriers, Essex Class Carriers, US Light Carriers, Japanese fleet carriers [Photos]

N.	The Role of Oil in the Pacific War [Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
	Oil’s Early History, Development of the Oil Industry in the United States, Royal Dutch Shell, The Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine Industry, The Rise of the Automobile, Tanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield Mobility, Aviation Gasoline, Interwar Development of the Aeronautical Industry, Global Oil Output, Oil and the Decision for War, Conclusion [Photos]

O.	Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria [April 1945–5 September 1945] [Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
	Introduction, Russo-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth Century, The Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast Asia, The Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River Clashes, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, The Yalta Conference, Japanese Preparations for the Defense of Manchuria, Deployment of Soviet Forces, Soviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from Mongolia, Invasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern Siberia, The Battle of Mutanchiang, The Battle of Sakhalin Island, The Occupation of the Kuril Islands The Significance of the Soviet Invasions

APPENDIX C
ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED

Electronics, Radio and Radar: Throughout the Pacific War, America maintained a significant advantage in radio technology and communications. A major leg up to the development of these technologies had come in World War I when the American Army in Europe, despairing of the French telephone system, had built its own telephone network under advice from AT&T.

Radio expertise developed during that war created a pool of patents that were turned over to a newly created business, Radio Corporation of America (RCA). The President of RCA, David Sarnoff, rapidly grew the consumer and retail possibilities of the new technologies and, along with competitors, invested heavily in research and development. The result was that by 1940, there were 26m radio sets in America and an additional 4m radios installed in automobiles. At the World Fair in New York, opened by President Roosevelt on 3 April 1939, RCA demonstrated a wondrous new consumer device that they called a television. By end of the year RCA had also established the world’s first television broadcasting station. GE built a kitchen with talking devices and the Westinghouse stand featured a robot and mechanical dog. America was in the process of developing a mass consumer electronics industry. The result was that America, by comparison with Japan or indeed any other country, possessed a broad pool of technological expertise at all levels from research, manufacture, usage, repair and maintenance.

The depth of technical expertise in these areas was a boon to the development of radio communication for ships and airplanes as well as radar detection equipment. Also ‘radar was adapted for a variety of uses from aircraft-recognition responders, proximity fuses, detection countermeasures, and range finding.’⁵⁰ With substantial private resourcing of investment in these new technologies America had the technical and management expertise to mass produce military products in the radio and communications sectors.

By 1940 Westinghouse alone was able to offer 19 different radio products. When the Navy asked for ten-band radio transmitters for carrier-based bombers, Westinghouse developed the AN/ARC that contained 4,600 precision components in a container no bigger than a humidor. Meanwhile GE supplied nearly every Army bomber with a 75-watt radio called SCR-287. A compact radio with five frequencies of which four were pre-tuned, the SCR-287 was used in tanks, airplanes and battlefield command posts. GE also developed the ultra-robust, waterproof TBX radio used by Marines in amphibious landings.

Radar sets for the Navy were developed from the spring of 1941 when they commissioned the building of 400 shipboard units. Within six months the first sets were deployed on US destroyers. Air based ASB radar units were also manufactured for use by carrier planes. Westinghouse eventually produced 18,000 units and coped with over 2,000 component and design upgrades. Radar would eventually play an invaluable role in the critical undersea war. In the air the development of radar chaff and the production of electric noise to jam enemy radar also proved invaluable in reducing bomber losses. The linkage of GE’s SCR-584 radar to automatic gun directors on anti-aircraft weapons also helped stem the losses caused by kamikaze. Expertise in radio and electronics was also helpful in the development of mass production techniques for essential war devices such as timers and fuses. GE developed a plastic fuse and would eventually produce 29m of them at a cost of 25c each, compared to the one pound aluminum fuse costing over a dollar.

In some areas British technology was more advanced but, in the wake of ‘Lend-Lease’, Churchill felt obliged to hand over to the US Britain’s intellectual capital in the form of pioneering radio technologies. America had the funds and manpower to realize their full potential.

Appendices - Hirohito's War

APPENDIX C ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED

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APPENDIX C
ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED